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The enactive theory of perception hypothesizes that perceptual access to objects
depends on the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies, that is, on the know-how of
the regular ways in which changes in sensations depend on changes in movements.
This hypothesis can be extended into the social domain: perception of other minds
is constituted by mastery of self-other contingencies, that is, by the know-how of the
regular ways in which changes in others’ movements depend on changes in one’s
movements. We investigated this proposal using the perceptual crossing paradigm, in
which pairs of players are required to locate each other in an invisible one-dimensional
virtual space by using a minimal haptic interface. We recorded and analyzed the real-time
embodied social interaction of 10 pairs of adult participants. The results reveal a process
of implicit perceptual learning: on average, clarity of perceiving the other’s presence
increased over trials and then stabilized. However, a clearer perception of the other was
not associated with correctness of recognition as such, but with both players correctly
recognizing each other. Furthermore, the moments of correct mutual recognition tended
to happen within seconds. The fact that changes in social experience can only be
explained by the successful performance at the level of the dyad, and that this veridical
mutual perception tends toward synchronization, lead us to hypothesize that integration
of neural activity across both players played a role.
Keywords: embodied cognition, social cognition, enactive approach, virtual reality, agency detection, perceptual
awareness scale
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are going on a romantic date at the cinema. Inside the movie theater you sit down
next to your date, but it is so dark that you cannot see each other, leaving you uncertain about
their presence. At some point during the movie you feel your date’s hand touching your hand, and
you start holding hands. Your experience of watching the movie is transformed, as it takes on a
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more distinctively social quality: ‘‘we’’ are sharing this experience
with each other. How can such embodied social interaction have
this profound effect on an individual’s perceptual experience?
This study aimed to investigate how a person’s real-time
tactile interaction with other people can make an irreducible
difference to how that person experiences their self, others,
and the world, an effect which has been referred to as
‘‘genuine intersubjectivity’’ (Froese, 2018; Froese and Krueger,
forthcoming). It builds on the key role of interpersonal
contingencies that emerge from the coupling of human bodies
Dumas et al., 2014). This aim and basis stand in sharp
contrast to what has been characterized as the ‘‘methodological
individualism’’ of traditional cognitive science (Boden, 2006),
which in its more extreme formulations has even taken an
isolated brain as the in-principle sufficient basis of all social
experience (Searle, 1990). Nevertheless, the notion of genuine
intersubjectivity is consistent with a small but growing number
of psychological and neuroscientific experiments as well as agent-
based simulation studies, which point to the constitutive role of
social interaction for social cognition (e.g., De Jaegher et al., 2010;
Schilbach et al., 2013; Candadai et al., 2019).
A particularly promising methodology for studying the
effects of real-time embodied social interaction is the so-called
‘‘perceptual crossing’’ paradigm, which was originally proposed
by Lenay and colleagues (Lenay et al., 2006; Auvray et al., 2009).
Pairs of participants are connected to an invisible 1D virtual
space using a minimal haptic computer interface, and their task
is to locate the other person’s avatar based on the patterns
of interaction while avoiding distractor objects (see Figure 1).
This paradigm has inspired several experimental variations and
different applications (for a review, see Auvray and Rohde, 2012;
Deschamps et al., 2016; Zapata-Fonseca et al., 2018; Barone et al.,
2020). Since the first studies, there have been discussions of
participants’ anecdotal reports of their social encounters (Lenay,
2010; Auvray and Rohde, 2012). However, to investigate genuine
intersubjectivity more experimentally, such studies must also
include an explicit assessment of participants’ lived experience.
An important step in this direction was provided by a
variation of the perceptual crossing paradigm by Froese et al.
(2014a), in which participants were asked to rate the clarity
of their perception of the other’s presence. They found that a
participant’s perceptual clarity was a joint achievement: it was not
associated with a participant’s correct identification of the other
per se, but rather with bidirectional interactions that permitted
both participants to successfully recognize each other. This
conclusion was further supported by subsequent explorations of
the same dataset (Froese et al., 2014b; Zapata-Fonseca et al., 2016;
Kojima et al., 2017). This was the first empirical proof of the
concept of genuine intersubjectivity.
However, given that this was an isolated experiment, it
remained to be seen whether it could be replicated. This has
now been accomplished by Hermans et al. (2020), as well
as by the present study. Hermans et al. (2020) implemented
a shorter variation of Froese et al.’s (2014a) perceptual
crossing paradigm as part of a longitudinal population study
of adolescents. Importantly, despite this reduction in overall
interaction time, as well as differences in the target population
FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup of the perceptual crossing paradigm. (A)
The physical setup. The two participants can only engage with each other via
a haptic human-computer interface that reduces their scope for bodily
interaction to a minimum of horizontal left to right movement and tactile
sensation. Each player’s interface consists of two parts: (1) a trackball that
controls the displacement of their “avatar” in an invisible 1D virtual
environment; and (2) a hand-held haptic feedback device that vibrates at a
constant frequency for as long as the avatar overlaps another virtual object
and remains off otherwise. (B) The virtual setup. Players are embodied as
minimal avatars on an invisible line that wraps around after 600 units of
space. Each avatar consists of a binary contact sensor and a body object.
Unbeknownst to the players a “shadow” object is attached to each avatar
body at a fixed distance of 150 units. There are also two static objects, one
for each player. All objects are four units long and can therefore only be
distinguished interactively in terms of their different affordances for
engagement.
and in the assessment of participant’s experience, they also
found that subjective experience was highest specifically in trials
when both participants were jointly correct in detecting each
other’s presence.
Hypotheses
In the present study, we replicated Froese et al.’s experimental
setup and tested several hypotheses related to genuine
intersubjectivity. This concept is best approached by drawing on
the theoretical resources of the phenomenological tradition in
philosophy, especially its work on the phenomenology of direct
social perception (Gallagher, 2008; Krueger, 2012), and of the
enactive approach to cognitive science, especially the enactive
theory of perception (Noë, 2012) and its extension to social
perception (De Jaegher, 2009; McGann and De Jaegher, 2009). In
essence, this theory holds that object perception consists in the
skillful regulation of sensorimotor interaction, which involves
knowing how sensations of the object would change concerning
possible movements of one’s body, and which provides direct
access to the object of perception. An individual’s mastery of
these dependencies of sensations on bodily movements, that
is, of so-called sensorimotor contingencies, entails a better
perceptual grasp of the perceived object.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 September 2020 | Volume 14 | Article 560657
Froese et al. The Feeling Is Mutual
The same idea of sensorimotor contingencies can also be
applied to the perception of another person. It is known that
the motor system is involved in social cognition, which is often
interpreted as simulation or mirroring (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia,
2016), but can also be considered as enactive perception in a
social context (Gallagher, 2009; but see Gallese, 2017). More
specifically, in line with sensorimotor theory (O’Regan et al.,
2005), it has been proposed that social perception consists in the
skillful co-regulation of social interaction (De Jaegher et al., 2010;
Froese and Di Paolo, 2011), which involves both participants
knowing how sensations caused by the other’s bodily movements
would change concerning their possible bodily movements, and
the mastery of these ‘‘self-other contingencies’’ thereby provides
access to the other person (McGann and De Jaegher, 2009).
According to this enactive theory, there is a crucial
difference between social perception and object perception
in terms of their respective conditions of successful
perceptual access: both depend on skillful regulation of
interaction, but in the case of perceiving another person
as another person this access additionally depends on a
complementary skillful response by the other person. If
the other does not respond appropriately, the perceptual
situation would be more akin to that of object perception,
for example of perceiving the other’s physical body. This
theory, therefore, predicts that the basis of social perception
goes beyond the individual perceiver to include another
perceiver. However, it is not yet entirely clear what this inter-
personal basis of social perception means for the perceiver’s
experience. At least two possibilities present themselves,
which we will refer to as weak and strong forms of genuine
intersubjectivity, respectively:
(1) Weak genuine intersubjectivity: This possibility accepts that
the basis of social perception can be distributed across
two persons, such that one person’s perception of the
other person is partly constituted by their ongoing social
interaction. However, it remains conservative about the
boundaries of consciousness, because it still maintains
that each person’s experience remains the property of
only that individual. This implies that there are two
independent, non-overlapping experiences; each person’s
social perception can be shaped by the other’s movements,
but without ever constituting a single, jointly sharedmoment
of experience.
(2) Strong genuine intersubjectivity: This possibility also accepts
that the basis of social perception can be distributed across
two persons, but it is more liberal about the boundaries
of consciousness. It rejects the claim that two interacting
persons must always have two independent experiences
and instead accepts the possibility that an interactively
extended basis can also give rise to one jointly unfolding
experience, for instance of mutually perceiving each other.
This implies that this single, jointly shared experience is
better characterized as a moment of co-presence that is
grasped from each perceiver’s specific point of view.
The possibility of weak genuine intersubjectivity implies
that two people in interaction can have their experience
shaped by that ongoing interaction at different times. The
possibility of strong genuine intersubjectivity, on the other
hand, implies tighter inter-personal integration, which fits
well with growing evidence that there is a synchronization
of neural activity across brains during social interaction,
including in the faster frequency bands, and that this
is the basis for inter-personal neuronal integration that
has implications for different aspects of social cognition
(Valencia and Froese, 2020).
More specifically, Froese (2018) has suggested extending
Varela’s (1999) neuro-phenomenological analysis of
present-time consciousness to the social domain. The idea
that genuine intersubjectivity requires interpersonal integration
at the most fundamental level of temporality resonates with
research in the phenomenology of consciousness (Rodemeyer,
2010), and complements it with a scientific methodology.
Varela highlights that the conscious moment of ‘‘now’’ is not an
instant but has a duration of 1–3 s. He argues that this duration
results from the amount of time it takes for neural activity
in an individual’s brain to become transiently integrated via
long-range synchronization.
Accordingly, an attractive hypothesis of how two people could
experience that ‘‘we’’ are sharing one and the same ‘‘now,’’ is that
their co-regulated social interaction caused their neural activity
to become synchronized. We did not directly investigate neural
activity in the current experiment, but if this hypothesis is on
the right track, then we would expect the time scale of 3 s to be
relevant for mutual veridical perception.
We set out to investigate this theory of social perception and
the possibilities of weak and strong genuine intersubjectivity in
terms of the following hypotheses:
(1) We hypothesized that participants’ capacity to correctly
recognize the other will increase over trials, as they learn to
redeploy their existing skill of embodied social interaction
via the haptic computer interface.
(2) We hypothesized that clarity of the other’s perceived
presence will increase over trials, as perceptual learning will
improve access to the other person.
(3) We hypothesized that increased clarity of the other’s
presence will not be explained by the correctness of an
individual perceiver’s recognition of the other person, but
by the correctness of both perceivers’ recognition of each
other, as the shift from object perception to social perception
involves a shift from regulation to co-regulation that offers a
shared opportunity of recognition to both participants.
(4) We hypothesized that the moments of recognition in trials
where both participants correctly recognize each other will
tend to be synchronized, specifically in the time scale of 3 s, as
a reflection of the shift from individual action to joint action.
(5) We hypothesized that the synchronization of moments of
recognition will correlate with the clarity of the perception
of the other person, specifically in the time scale of 3 s, as a
reflection of the shift from two individual experiences to one
intersubjectively shared experience.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are intended to demonstrate, in
behavioral and experiential terms respectively, that an embodied
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skill of perceiving others is being (re-)acquired throughout
the experiment. Hypothesis 3 is aimed at supporting the
concept of weak genuine intersubjectivity, i.e., the idea that
co-regulated interpersonal interaction makes an irreducible
difference to individual experience. Hypothesis 4 and 5 are aimed
at supporting the concept of strong genuine intersubjectivity,
i.e., that there is a single joint action giving rise to one
shared moment of veridical mutual recognition that ‘‘we’’ are
now experiencing, based on the assumption that this fusion
of individual streams of experiencing will require integration
of neural activity across both participants in the time scale
of seconds.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We employed a version of the perceptual crossing experiment
that was designed to capture subjective reports of participants’
perceptual awareness of the other’s presence to investigate its
sensorimotor basis (Froese et al., 2014a,b; Kojima et al., 2017).
Experimental Equipment
In the perceptual crossing experiment, two participants are
seated at separate desks such that they cannot perceive each other
visually; they also wear noise-canceling headphones to prevent
mutual auditory perception (Figure 1A). Each participant can
establish contact with her partner only via a simple human-
computer interface consisting of two components: (1) a trackball
for making horizontal movements; and (2) a hand-located
vibration motor that is either on or off. The trackball is operated
with the dominant hand and it controls the motions of an avatar
located in an invisible circular 1D virtual space (Figure 1B). The
motor vibrates as long as the avatar overlaps with another virtual
object in this space. Each participant can encounter three objects:
(i) the other’s avatar; (ii) a moving object that ‘‘shadows’’ the
other’s avatar by following the same trajectory at a distance; and
(iii) a static object. Regardless of the object type, the vibratory
feedback is only on (and off otherwise).
Experimental Procedure
Participants were told to work as a team and were asked to come
up with a team name, with which they would be ranked against
other teams participating in the study. They were instructed to
navigate through the invisible shared space to find each other.
They were asked to signal with a click (only once per trial)
when they became aware of interacting with the other player; for
each click correctly identifying their partner the team would gain
1 point, for each wrong click they would lose 1 point. However,
no feedback about the correctness of clicks was provided during
the experiment. Participants were first individually familiarized
with the human-computer interface. Then each pair was tested
for 20 trials, consisting of 60 s each (due to errors the last
five trials and the last trial of teams 1 and 6, respectively, were
not recorded). This is the first time the perceptual crossing
experiment has been run for 20 trials; Froese et al. (2014a)
had employed 15 trials, whereas Hermans et al. (2020) used
only six trials. The aim of using 20 trials was to see if there
would be a change in results if participants have more time
to interact.
After each trial, the experience of the players was evaluated
through questionnaires based on a version of the Perceptual
Awareness Scale (PAS), which in its original formulation was
used for visual perception (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004), but
was adapted by Froese et al. (2014a) for social perception. After
each trial in which a participant clicked, his or her awareness
of the other’s presence at the moment of the click was assessed
with values from one to four corresponding to ‘‘no experience,’’
‘‘ambiguous experience,’’ ‘‘almost clear experience,’’ and ‘‘clear
experience,’’ respectively.
The target of each click was categorized as one of the
three objects or as unknown. Target assignment was first done
automatically based on calculated distances at the time of the
click, following (Froese et al., 2014a). This was followed by trial-
by-trial visual inspection of plots of the movement trajectories by
TF and LZF (see Supplementary Trial Data). Any discrepancies
in the target assignment were resolved by TF and LZF in
discussion with IL.
Participants
Twenty adults took part in the perceptual crossing experiment,
ages ranged between 18 and 47 years old (median of age = 28),
and there were 6 women and 14 men (for details, see
Appendix of the Supplementary Statistical Information).
Participants were recruited from acquaintances at UNAM
in Mexico City. Only healthy volunteers were considered;
individuals with neurological, psychiatric, or movement
disorders (clinically diagnosed) were excluded. Participation was
voluntary and all participants gave their informed consent.
Ten teams were created as pairs of volunteers became
available. Three teams were composed of strangers, while
participants in other teams had some history of interaction
from before and some were friends. Some participants
were familiar with perceptual crossing from the literature,
but none had previous experience of participating in such
experiments. Data collection took place between April and
May 2018.
Statistical Analyses
We specified a statistical model that allowed us to simultaneously
examine the relations among the following variables:
(a) individual success and (b) joint success in recognizing
the other player, (c) the PAS-responses, (d) the inter-click
delay (dichotomized, with a value of 1 in case that both players
clicked within the same timeframe of 3 s, and 0 otherwise)
and (e) the trial number, by which we modeled a learning
process for individual successes and PAS-responses across
trials. The effects were specified as depicted in Figure 2, by
including (binary or ordinal) probit regression submodels for
the endogenous variables (individual success, joint success,
and PAS-responses); the learning process was modeled
through piece-wise regression, with first a learning stage
allowing improvement, and subsequently, a consolidation
stage where the individual is assumed to operate at the same
level. The model is hierarchical (i.e., it includes random
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FIGURE 2 | Relations among observed variables at the level of the team
(joint recognition, inter-click delay), trial (trial number), and individual
participant [individual recognition, Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS)
response], as modeled in the statistical analysis. Dotted arrows indicate that
for those relations no direct effect was found.
effects) as it takes into account the nested structure of
the data (with both individuals responding to each trial,
and 20 trials for each team) and was fitted using a fully
Bayesian approach.
All data can be found in the Supplementary Data Table,
while further details of the analysis (together with a complete
description of the results) can be found in the Supplementary
Statistical Information.
RESULTS
In total, we recorded 194 trials, for a possibility of
194× 2 = 388 clicks and PAS-responses. A click was produced in
311 of these 388 cases (i.e., 80%). Of these 311 clicks, 225 (72%)
were correct clicks, responding to the other’s avatar. In 79 (41%)
of the 194 trials, players produced jointly correct clicks. In 48
(25%) of the 194 trials, both players clicked but either or both
gave an incorrect click. There were 307 PAS-responses (four
clicks did not receive a PAS-response).
Overall, the frequencies for the four PAS-response categories,
ordered from ‘‘no experience’’ to ‘‘clear experience,’’ are 20 (6%
out of 307), 91 (30%), 100 (33%), and 96 (31%), respectively.
For the 85 PAS-responses associated with an incorrect click,
the frequencies are 6 (7%), 31 (37%), 34 (40%), 14 (16%),
respectively. Responses conditional upon a (65) correct click
in non-jointly successful trials were: 6 (9%), 30 (46%), 16
(25%), and 13 (20%), while responses conditional upon a
(157) correct click in jointly successful trials were: 8 (5%), 30
(19%), 50 (32%), and 69 (44%).
We summarize here the main findings from the
detailed statistical analysis included as Supplementary
Statistical Information, focusing on the hypotheses listed
in the introduction:
(1) We used a piecewise regression model for the individual
learning process of correctly recognizing the other player,
with a learning stage and a consolidation stage. On average,
learning takes place between trial 1 and trial 3.2 [95%-high
posterior density interval = (1.7, 4.9)]; however, there are
large differences, with individuals who apparently do not
enter in a learning process and others for whom learning
takes place until half the experiment.
(2) Concerning the learning process on experiential clarity, the
breakpoint that separates the learning and consolidation
stage is situated, on average, at trial 5.1 [95%-HPDI = (1.1,
9.1)], but again with a relatively large variance1.
(3) The results do not show evidence of an effect of individual
success in recognizing the other on the PAS-responses [with
an estimated effect on the probit scale of β = −0.16; 95%-
HPDI = (−0.55, 0.20)], whereas joint success does lead to
higher PAS-values [β = 0.69; 95%-HPDI = (0.31, 1.06)].
(4) A short inter-click delay, of less than 3 s, goes with a higher
probability of individual success [with an estimated effect on
the probit scale of β = 0.70, 95%-HPDI = (0.16, 1.29)] as
well as a higher probability of joint success in recognizing
the other [β = 1.01, 95%-HPDI = (0.40, 1.59)].
(5) There is no clear evidence of a direct association between
short inter-click delays and PAS-responses [β = 0.14,
95%-HPDI = (−0.28, 0.54)]. Note, however, that there
is an indirect effect given that short inter-click delays
are associated with higher probabilities of joint successful
recognition (see the previous point), which in turn leads to
higher PAS-responses (see Point 3).
DISCUSSION
These results support genuine intersubjectivity, although
evidence for strong genuine intersubjectivity remains indirect.
First, on average, participants’ perceptual experience of the
other’s presence became clearer during the experiment. This
change in experience tended to stabilize within six trials, and
our study thereby supports Hermans et al.’s (2020) decision to
run a shorter experiment of six trials. However, it is noteworthy
that we did not find compelling evidence that, on average,
participants improved their capacity to click correctly. Some
improved quickly, others were slow learners, and some never
improved even though we had extended the number of trials
to 20 trials. Future work could investigate the reasons for this
diversity in learning outcomes; presumably, the recognition task
is facilitated if participants have a history of close interaction, and
there may also be an influence of individuals’ age and sex, which
are factors that we did not take into consideration in the current
analysis. Yet the fact that clarity of social presence increased,
and did so independently of individuals’ success at objectively
recognizing the other, also suggests that an explanation of this
phenomenological change should look beyond individuals.
Second, indeed, we found compelling evidence for genuine
intersubjectivity: an individual’s increased perceptual clarity of
the other’s presence could only be explained by taking into
account task performance at the level of the dyad, and not at the
level of the individuals. In other words, an individual’s correct
1As explained in the Supplementary Statistical Information (and due to the small
sample size), this and the previous result must be interpreted with caution, as the
associated parameter estimates have wide credibility intervals.
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FIGURE 3 | Estimated distribution of inter-click delays for joint-success trials
and non-joint-success trials (i.e., where either one or both players produced a
click that did not correctly identify the other). The null hypothesis (based on
independent uniform distributions of both players’ clicks) is represented by a
thin gray line. We graphed the estimated density function separately for both
conditions: joint-success trials (upper figure) and non-joint-success trials
(lower figure). To allow a better comparison, we show (by a thin gray curve)
the estimated density function of the other condition in both figures.
Furthermore, the vertical lines connecting the density with the abscissa
represent the observed values (79 inter-click intervals for joint success; 48 for
non-joint success). Shorter inter-click intervals are more likely than longer
intervals. Importantly, comparing joint-success to non-joint-success trials,
inter-click intervals tend to be even shorter, with for example the estimated
probability that an interval is below 3 s being equal to 0.25 and 0.14,
respectively.
recognition of the other was necessary but not sufficient to
explain the changed quality of perceptual experience; the other’s
involvement, as measured in terms of their correct recognition of
the self, was also necessary.
It is reassuring that we managed to replicate this dependence
of perceptual experience on the interaction process using a
comprehensive statistical model. This key finding is in tension
with the traditional view of perception as a brain-based process
of furnishing mental representations inside of the individual.
Instead, it fits better with the enactive view that the basis of
perceptual experience extends into sensorimotor interaction,
which in the case of social perception also includes a relationship
with another subject. Future work could try to uncover these
FIGURE 4 | Graphical representation of the relationship between individuals’
responses. Responses were associated with the PAS, individuals’ correctly
recognizing the other player (i.e., correct or incorrect click), and the dyads’
inter-click delay in trials where both members of the dyad produced a click.
The thin vertical gray lines connect both responses in a dyad that correspond
to the same trial and projects the corresponding points to the horizontal axis
to show the corresponding inter-click delay.
distinctive movement patterns. Based on past analyses, we
can expect increases in interdependence as measured by, for
example, turn-taking, cross-correlations, and transfer entropy in
sensorimotor dynamics (Kojima et al., 2017).
Third, we found indications of the possibility of
interpersonally extended experience of veridical mutual
recognition (strong genuine intersubjectivity). As revealed
by Figure 3, comparing jointly to non-jointly correct clicks,
inter-click intervals tended to be shorter, with the estimated
probability that an interval is below 3 s being equal to 0.25 and
0.14, respectively. Also, there was an indirect effect of inter-click
intervals within 3 s on increased clarity of social presence, given
that those intervals are associated with a higher probability
of joint success, which is associated with higher PAS ratings.
This tendency of jointly correct 3-s inter-click intervals to be
associated with higher PAS ratings can also be seen in Figure 4;
future studies with larger sample sizes may still uncover a
direct effect.
On the other hand, perhaps we did not develop our
hypotheses carefully enough. In contrast to the representational
approach to perception, the enactive approach has emphasized
that perceptual experience is constituted by certain kinds of
organism-environment interaction; hence, the experience is not
an entity that is somehow separate from that interaction. Or,
more strongly, the perceptual experience is identical with the
sensorimotor interaction (Myin and Zahnoun, 2018), or at least
not something added to the process (Froese and Taguchi, 2019).
Accordingly, the fact that the effect on the clarity of social
perception is specifically mediated by jointly correct recognition
is consistent with another intriguing possibility: the social quality
of experience is constituted by their social interaction. This
would also account for the puzzling finding that the residual
correlation between PAS-responses of both individuals in a dyad
is close to zero, which implies that the other effects included
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 September 2020 | Volume 14 | Article 560657
Froese et al. The Feeling Is Mutual
in the model (the learning process, individual and joint success
in recognizing the other, and the inter-click delay) may fully
account for this correlation.
Overall, this is a promising line of investigation for future
work, and it should be possible to further clarify the basis and
extent of genuine intersubjectivity by increasing the sample size
and by applying a hyperscanning approach to measure neural
activity of both participants.
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